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Abstract
This paper describes research _ concerned with au-
tomating the monitoring and control of spacecraft sys-
tems. In particu]ar, the paper examines the app]ica-
tion of SR,I's Procedural Reasoning System (PRS) to
the handling of malfunctions in the Reaction Control
System (RCS) of NASA's space shuttle. Unlike tra-
ditional monitoring and control systems, PRS is able
to reason about and perform complex tasks in a very
flexible and robust manner, somewhat in the manner
of a human assistant. Using various RCS malfunctions
as examples (including sensor faults, leaking compo-
nents, multiple alarms, and regulator and jet failures),
it is shown how PRS manages to combine both goal-
directed reasoning and the ability to react rapidly to
unanticipated changes in its environment. In conclu-
sion, some important issues in the design of PRS are
reviewed and future enhancements are indicated.
1 Introduction
As space missions increase in complexity and frequency, the au-
tomation of mission operations grows more and more critical.
Such operations include subsystem monitoring, preventive mainte-
nance, malfunction handling, fault isolation and diagnosis, com-
munications management, maintenance of life support systems,
power management, monitoriugofexperiments, satellite servicing,
payload deployment, orbital-vehicle operations, orbital construc-
tion and assembly, and control of extraterrestrial rovers. Automa-
tion of these tasks can be expected to improve mission productiv-
ity and safety, increase versatility, lessen dependence on ground
systems, and reduce demands for crew involvement in system con-
trol.
It is very important that any system designed to perform these
tasks be as flexible, robust, and interactive as possible. At the
minimum, it should be capable of responding to and diagnos-
ing abnormalities in a variety of configurations and operational
modes. It should be able to integrate information from various
parts of the space vehicle systems and recognize potential prob-
lems prior to alarm limits being exceeded.
The system should suggest and execute strategies for contain-
ing damage and for making the system secure, without losing crit-
ical diagnostic information. It should be able to utilize standard
malfunction handling procedures and take account of all the rele-
vant factors that, in crisis situations, are easily overlooked. False
alarms and invalid parameter readings should be detected, and al-
ternative means for deducing parameter values should be utilized
where possible.
In parallel with efforts to contain damage and temporarily re-
configure vehicle subsystems, the system should be able to begin
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diagnosis of the problem and incrementally adjust reconfigura-
tion strategies as diagnostic information is obtained. The system
should also be capable of communicating with other systems to
seek information, advise of critical conditions_ and avoid harm-
ful interactions. Throughout this process, the system should be
continually reevaluating the state of the space vehicle and should
be capable of changing focus to attend to more serious problems
should they occur.
Finally, the system should be able to explain the reasons for
any proposed course of action in terms that are familiar to as-
tronauts and mission controllers. It should be able to graphically
display the system schematics, the procedures it is intending to ex-
ecute, and the critical parameter values upon which its judgment
is based.
Achieving this kind of behavior is welt beyond the capabilities
of conventional real-time systems. It requires, in contrast, mech-
anisms that can reason in a !'rational" way about the state of
the space vehicle and the actions that need be taken in any given
situation. Moreover, the system should be both coal directed and
reactive. That is, while seeking to attain specific goals, the system
should also be able to react appropriately to new situations in real
time. In particular, it should be able to completely alter focus and
goal priorities as circumstances change. In addition, the system
should be able to reflect on its own reasoning processes. It should
be able to choose when to change goals, when to plan and when
to act, and how to use effectively its deductive capabilities.
A number of system architectures for handling some of these
aspects of reai-time behavior have been recently proposed e.g.,
[Firby, 1987; Kaelbling, 1987; Hayes-Rotlh 1985]. Some of these
approaches are evaluated elsewhere [Georgeff and Ingrand, 1989;
Georgeff and Lansky, 1987; Laffey el al., 1988].
The system to be discussed in the paper is called a Procedu-
ral Reasoning System (PRS). It has been developed over a num-
ber of years at SRI International and has been reported, in part,
in previous publications [Georgeff and Ingrand, 1989; Georgeff
and Ingrand, 1988; Georgeff, 1988; Georgeff and Lansky, 1986a;
Georgeff and Lansky, 1986b; Georgeff and Lansky, 1987].
2 Procedural Reasoning System
PRS is designed to be used as an embedded, real-time reasoning
system. As shown in Figure 1, PRS consists of (1) a database
containing current beliefs or facts about the world; (2) a set of
current goals to be realized; (3) a set of plans, called knowledge
areas (KAs), describing how certain sequences of actions and tests
may be performed to achieve given goals or to react to particu-
lar situations; and (4) an intention structure containing all KAs
that have been chosen for execution. An interpreler (or inference
mechanism) manipulates these components, selecting appropriate
plans based on the system's beliefs and goals, placing those se-
lected on the intention structure, and executing them.
The system interacts with its environment, including other sys-
tems, through its database (which acquires new beliefs in response
to changes in the environment) and 01rough the actions that it
performs as it carries out its intentions.
Goals and Beliefs
The beliefs of PRS provide information on the state of the space
vehicle systems and are represented in a first-order logic. For
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Figure 1: Structure of the Procedural Reasoning System
example, the fact that a particular valve, vl say, is closed could
be represented by the statement (position vl ol).
The goals of PRS are descriptions of desired tasks or behaviors.
In the logic used by PRS, the goal to achieve a certain condition
C is written (! C); to test for the condition is written (? C); to
wait until the condition is true is written (" C); and to conclude
that the condition is true is written (=_ C). For example, the goat
to close valve vl could be represented as (! (posi'_ion v! cl),
and to test for it being closed as (? (position vl ¢1)).
Knowledge Areas
Knowledge about how to accomplish given goals or react to cer-
tain situations is represented in PRS by declarative procedure
specifications called Knowledge Areas (KAs) (see, for example,
Figure 10). Each KA consists of a body, which describes the steps
of the procedure, and an invocation condition, which specifies un-
der what situations the KA is useful and applicable. Together,
the invocation condition and body of a KA express a declarative
fact about the results and utility of performing certain sequences
of actions under certain conditions [Georgeff and Lansky, 1986a].
The body of a KA can be viewed as a plan or plan schema. It is
represented as a graph with one distinguished start node and pos-
sibly multiple end nodes. The arcs in the graph are labeled with
the subgoals to be achieved in carrying out the plan. Successful
execution of a KA consists of achieving each of the subgoals la-
beling a path from the start node to an end node. This formalism
provides a natural and efficient representation of plans involving
any of the usual control constructs, including conditional selec-
tion, iteration, and recursion.
The invocation condition contains a triggering part describing
the events that must occur for the KA to be executed. Usually,
these events consist of the acquisition of some new goals (in which
case, the KA is invoked in a goal-directed fashion) or some change
in system beliefs (resulting in data-directed or reactive invocation)
and may involve both.
The set of KAs in a PRS application system not only consists of
procedural knowledge about a specific domain, but also includes
rnetalevel KAs; that is, information about the manipulation of the
beliefs, goals, and intentions of PRS itself. For example, typical
metalevel KAs encode various methods for choosing among mul-
tiple applicable KAs, modifying and manipulating intentions, and
computing the amount of reasoning that can be undertaken, given
the real-time constraints of the problem domain.
The Intention Structure
The intention structure contains all those tasks that the system
has chosen for execution, either immediately or at some later time.
These adopted tasks are called intentions. A single intention con-
sists of some initial KA together with all the sub-KAs that are
being used in attempting to successfully execute that KA. It is
directly analogous to a process in a conventional programming
system.
At any given moment, the intentionstructure may contain a
number of such intentions,some of which may be suspended or
deferred,some of which may be waiting for certain conditions
to hold priorto activation,and some of which may be metalevel
intentionsfordecidingamong variousalternativecoursesofaction.
For example, in handling a malfunction in a propulsion sys-
tem, PRS might have, at some instant,three tasks (intentions)in
the intentionstructure:one suspended while waiting for,say, the
fuel-tank pressure to decrease below some designated threshold;
another suspended afterhaving justposted some goal that isto be
accomplished (such as interconnectingone shuttlesubsystem with
another);and the third,a metalevel procedure, being executed to
decide which way to accomplish that goal.
Execution
Unless some new belief or goal activates some new KA, PRS will
try to fulfill any intentions it has previously decided upon. This
results in focussed, goal-directed reasoning in which KAs are ex-
panded in a manner analogous to the execution of subroutines in
procedural programming systems. But if some important new fact
or goal does become known, PRS will reassess its current inten-
tions and perhaps choose to work on something else. Thus, not all
options that are considered by PRS arise as a result of means-end
reasoning. Changes in the environment may lead to changes in the
system goals or beliefs, which in turn may result in the consid-
eration of new plans that are not means to any already intended
end. PRS is therefore able to change its focus completely and
pursue new goals when the situation warrants it. In many space
operations, this may happen quite frequently as emergencies of
various degrees of severity occur in the process of handling other,
less critical tasks.
Multiple Systems
In some applications,itisnecessary to monitor and processmany
sourcesof information at the same time. Because ofthis,PRS was
designed to allowseveralinstantiationsof the basic system to run
in parallel.Each PRS instantiatlonhas itsown data base,goals,
and KAs, and operates asynchronously relativeto other PRS in-
stantiations,communicating with them by sending messages.
The system described above has been implemented on Sym-
bolics3600 SeriesLISP, Sun Series3, and Mac Ivory machines.
A more complete description of PRS can be found elsewhere
[Georgeff and Ingrand, 1989; Georgeff and Ingrand, 1988].
3 The RCS Application
The system chosen for experimentation with PRS is the Reaction
Control System (RCS) of the space shuttle. The system structure
is depicted in the schematic of Figure 2 (left part). One of the
aims of our research is to automate the malfunction procedures
for this subsystem. A sample malfunction procedure is presented
in Figure 3.
The RCS provides propulsive forces from a collection of jet
thrusters to control the attitude of the space shuttle. There are
three RCS modules, two aft and one forward. Each module con-
tains a collection of primary and vernier jets, a fuel tank, an oxi-
dizer tank, and two helium tanks, along with associated fecdlines,
manifolds, and other supporting equipment. Propellant flow, both
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fuel and oxidizer, is normal!y maintained by pressurizing the pro-
pellant tanks with helium.
The helium supply is fed to its associated propellant tank
through two redundant lines, designated A and B. The pressure
in the helium tanks is normally about 3000 psi; this is reduced to
about 245 psi by regulators that are situated between each helium
tank and its corresponding propellant tank. A number of pressure
and temperature transducers are attached at various parts of the
system to allow monitoring.
Each RCS module receives all commands (both manual and
automatic) via the space shuttle flight computer software. This
software resides on five genera/purpose computers (GPCs). Up
to four of these computers contain redundant sets of the Primary
Avionics Software System (PASS) and the fifth contains the soft-
ware for the Backup Flight System (BFS). All of the GPCs can
provide information to the crew by means of CRT displays.
The various valves in an RCS module are controlled from a
panel of switches and talkbacks (Figure 2, right part). Each switch
moves associated valves in both the fuel subsystem and the oxidizer
subsystem) Switches can be set to OPEN, CLOSE, or GPC,
the last providing the GPCs with control of the valve position.
The talkbaek provides feedback on the associated valve position.
The talkback reading normally corresponds with the associated
switch position, except when the switch is in GPC; in this case,
the talkback shows whichever position the GPC puts the valve in.
The talkbacks may not correspond if a valve has jammed or if the
control or feedback circuit is faulty. If the valves in both the fuel
and oxidizer subsystems do not move in unison, because of some
fault, the talkback displays a barberpole.
As with most dynamic systems, transient faults are common.
For example, in the process of changing switch position, there
will be a short time (about 2 seconds) when the positions of the
talkback and the switch will differ from one another. This is
because it takes this amount of time for the actual valve to change
its position. Furthermore, during this transition, the talkbaek will
also pass through the barberpole position. Thus, a mismatched
talkback and switch position or a barberpole reading does not
always indicate a system fault.
ZBecause the two propellant subsystems are identical, only one sys-
tem is represented in the left part of the figure.
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Figure 3: ARCS Malfunction Procedure
4 System Configuration
Two instances of PRS were set up to handle the RCS applica-
tion. One, called INTI_RFIC_., handles most of the low level trans-
ducer readings, effector control and feedback, and checks for faulty
transducers and effectors. The other, called somewhat mislead-
ingly RCS, contains most of the high-level malfunction procedures,
much as they appear in the malfunction handling manuals for the
shuttle. To test the system, a simulator for the actual RCS was
constructed.
The complete system configuration is shown in Figure 4. Each
of these parts is described in the following sections.
4.1 " The Simulator
During operation, the simulator sends transducer readings and
feedback from various effectors (primarily valves) to I_TERFACE
and communicates alarm messages as they appear on the shut-
tle system displays to RCS. The simulator, in turn, responds ap-
propriately to changes in valve switch positions as requested by
IIf'rZRFAC£. The simulator can be set to model a variety of fault
conditions, including misread transducers, stuck valves, system
leaks, and regulator failures.
A future imp.lementation of the system will be connected to
the more sophisticated shuttle simulator used at Johnson Space
Center.
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Figure 4: System Configuration
4.2 The RCS
The top-level PRS instantiation, RCS, contains most of the mal-
function handling procedures as they appear in the operational
manuals for the space shuttle. RCS takes an abstract view of the
domain: it deals in pressures and valve positions, and does not
know about transducers, switches, or talkbacks. For example,
whenever RCS needs to know the pressure in a particular part of
the system, it requests this information from INTERFACE, which is
expected to deduce the pressure from its knowledge of transducer
readings and transducer status. Similarly, RCS will simply request
that INTERFACE moves a valve to a certain position, and is not
concerned how this is achieved. In this way, RC$ can represent
the malfunction handling procedures in a clean and easily under-
standable way, without encumbering the procedures with various
cross-checks and other details,
4.3 The INTERFACE
The PRS instantiation INTERFACE handles all information con-
cerning transducer readings, valve switches, and valve talkbacks.
It handles requests from RCS for information on the pressures in
various parts of the system and for rates of change of these val-
ues. Determination of this information can require examination
of a variety of transducers, as readings depend on the status of
individual transducers, their location relative to the region whose
pressure is to be measured, and the connectivity of the system via
open valves.
III"rEI_ACE also handles requests from RCS to change the posi-
tion of the valves in the RCS. This involves asking the astronaut
to change switch positions, and waiting for confirmation from the
talkback.
While doing these tasks, INTERFACE is continually checking for
failures in any of the transducers or valve assemblies. When it
notices such failures, it will notify the astronaut or mission con-
troller and appropriately modify its procedures for determining
pressures or closing valves. It will also consider the consequences
of any failures, such as are prescribed in various flight rules for
the shuttle.
5 Sample Interactions
In this section, we examine different scenarios illustrating the ca-
pabilities of PRS.
5.1 Changing Valve Position
The following example illustrates the capacity of the system
to reason about more than one task at a time. Consider the
situation where INTERFACE gets a request from RCS to close
some valve, say frcs-ox-tk-isol-12-valve (Forward RCS, OX-
idizer TanK, one-two ISOLation VALVE). RCS achieves this
by sending INTERFACE the message (request RCS (!(position
frcs-ox-tk-isol-12-valve el))). Responding to this request,
INTERFACE calls a KA that, in turn, asks the astronaut to place
the switch corresponding to this valve in the closed position (see
Figure 5). Once the astronaut has done this, INTERFACE wilI wait
until the talkback shows the requested position and will then ad-
vise RCS that the valve has indeed been closed (Figure 5).
However, while this is taking place, INTERFACE will also notice
that., just after the switch is moved to the closed position, there is a
mismatch with the talkback indicator (which will still be showing
open, because of the normal delay in the valve starting to move).
Furthermore, a fraction of a second later, the talkback will move
into the barberpote position, another indication that things could
be wrong with the valve.
Each of these events will trigger a KA and thus initiate execu-
tion of a task (intention) that seeks to confirm that the talkback
moves to its correct position within a reasonable time; Figure 6
shows the KA which monitors the barberpole position. At this
point, the system is dealing with three different tasks, one respon-
sible for answering the request, one checking the miscomparison
between the switch and the talkback, and one checking for the
barberpole position. Each of these last two tasks immediateIy
suspend themselves (using the "wait-until" (') operator) while
awaiting the specified condition to become true.
For example, the task concerned with monitoring a talkback
barberpole reading will suspend itself until either the positions of
both the switch and the talkback agree, or 10 seconds elapses.
When either of these conditions become true, the task (intention)
will awaken and proceed with the next step. If the talkback is still
in the barberpole position, the astronaut or mission controller will
be notified of the problem. Otherwise, the KA fails, and simply
disappears from the intention structure.
Notice that the KAs that respond to the request from RCS to
change the valve position, that monitor for possible switch dilem-
mas, and that check the barberpole reading are all established
as different intentions at some stage during this process. Vari-
ous metalevel KAs must therefore be called, not only to establish
these intentions, but to decide which of the active ones to work
on next.
A typical state of the intention structure is shown in Fig-
ure 7. It shows a number of intentions in the system INTERFACE,
ordered for execution as indicated by the arrows. The inten-
tion labeled Meta Selector is a metalevel KA (Figure 8). The
other intentions include two that are checking potential switch
problems (Switch Dilemma (Barberpole) and Switch Dilemma
(Closed)) and one that isresponding to the request to closethe
valve (Open or Close Valve). The meta]evel intention,in this
case, is the one currently executing. Although not clear from the
figure, it has just created and ordered the new intentions resulting
from the talkback and the barberpole problems.
5.2 Handling Faulty Transducers
In this scenario, we show how two PRS agents cooperate and
control the execution of their intentions so as to handle faulty
transducers and the resulting false warning alarms.
We will .assume that transducer frcs-ox-tk-out-p-xdcr fails
and remains jammed at a reading of 170 psi. This causes a number
of things to happen. First, it causes a low-pressure alarm to be
activated. This will will be noticed by the PRS instantiation RCS,
which will immediately respond to the alarm by initiating exe-
cution of the KA (Pressurization Alarm (Propellant Tank)).
This KA will, in turn, request a pressure reading from INTERFACE
to ensure that the alarm is valid.
While this is happening, INTERFACE by itself has noticed that
the two transducers on the oxidizer tank disagree with one another
(in this ease, the other transducer is reading the nominal value of
245 psi). This invokes a KA that attempts to determine which of
the two transducers is faulty. It does this by first waiting a few
seconds to ensure that the mismatch is not simply a transient, and
then testing to see if one of the readings is outside normal linfits.
If so, it assumes this is the faulty transducer; this is indeed the
procedure used by astronauts and mission controllers Other KAs,
capable of more sophisticated acts such as checking the values
of downstream or upstream transducers, are used if there is no
corresponding transducer with which to do the cross-check.
Notice what could happen here if one is not careful. Having
more than one thing to do, INTERFACE could decide to service the
request for a pressure reading for the suspect tank. If it does so,
it will simply average the values of the two transducer readings
(yielding 207 psi) and advise RCS accordingly. Clearly, this is not
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what we want to happen: any suspect parameter readings should
be attended to before servicing requests that depend on them.
In the examples we have considered, it has been sufficient to
handle such problems with a relatively simple priority scheme.
We first ascribe the property of being a so-called "safety handler"
to all those KAs that should be executed at the earliest possible
time. Then we design the metalevel KA that chooses between po-
tentially applicable KAs to order all safety handlers for execution
prior to other intentions. In the example given above, the KA that
detects the faulty transducer is a safety handler, and thus is ex-
ecuted prior to servicing the request from RCS. When INTERFACE
eventually gets around to servicing the request from RCS, it disre-
gards the faulty transducer reading and thus advises RCS that the
pressure is 245 psi. RCS then determines that the alarm was ac-
tivated in error and that the pressure is within normal operating
range.
Even with all this going on, other things are happening within
the INTERFACE system. For example, the fact that the transducer
is determined to be bad, together with the fact that it is the very
transducer that informs the shuttle computers of overpressuriza-
tion problems, causes the invocation of another KA. This KA
:reflects a flight rule that states that overpressurization protection
is lost while the transducer is inoperative.
As before, metalevel KAs are invoked to determine which KAs
to adopt as intentions and how to order them on the intention
structure. The development of the intention structure during this
process is shown in Figure 9.
5.3 Failed Regulator
Let's now consider the operation of the top-level PRS instanti-
ation, RCS. The case we first examine occurs when the regula-
tor on the feed line between the helium tank and its associated
propellant tank fails. In this example, we will assume that the
fz'¢s-:fu-he-tk-k-z-eg has failed. We will focus primarily on RCS
(II_TEP.FACE is, of course, working away during this process as
discussed above).
The first thing that happens when the regulator fails is that
pressures throughout the fuel subsystem begin to rise. When
they exceed the upper limit of 300 psi, certain caution-warning
(cw) alarms are activated. These events trigger the execution of a
KA that attempts to confirm that the system is indeed overpres-
surized.
Note that this process is more complicated than it first appears.
The high transducer readings that gave rise to the caution-warning
alarm will also trigger KAs in the PRS system INTERFACE. These
KAs will proceed to verify that the corresponding transducers
are not faulty (as described in subsection 5.2 ); that is, that the
reading of the transducers is indeed accurate. While doing this,
or after doing this, INTERFACE will get a request from RCS to
advise the latest pressure readings. If INTERFACE is in the process
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of checking the transducers, it will defer answering this request
until it has completed its evaluation of transducer status. But
eventually it will return to answering the request _d, in the case
we are considering, advise that the preseure is indeed above 300
psi.
On concluding that the system is overpre_surt|ed, another
KA (Ovez'p_essurined Propellan'_ Tank) is activated and this,
eventually, concludes that the A regulator has failed (see Fig-
ure 10). Note that this KA establishes subgoale to closeboth the
A valve and the B valve, as there are cases when both are open.
For the A valve, this involves s request to TI[TI_ItF,tCIBas discussed
above. However, for the B valve, the system notices that the B
valve is already closed, Thus, its goal is directly achieved without
the necessity to perform any action or request,
The final goal of this KA activates another KA that opens the
valve of the alternate regulator (B). Having opened the valve, it
is desirable to then place it under the control of the on-board
computers. However, this cannot be done until the pressure in
the system drops below 300 psi, as otherwise the GPC will auto-
matically shut the valve again. Thus, the malfunction handling
procedures specify that the astronaut should wait until this condi-
tion is achieved before proceeding to place the valve switch in the
GPC position, ace achieves this by asking ZNTERFACE to moni-
tor the pressure and advise it when it drops below 300 psi. While
waiting for an answer, the task is suspended, and ltCS gets on with
whatever else it considers important.
When the pressure eventually drops below that threshold, the
task (intention) is awakened, and execution continued. Thus, the
valve switch is finally placed in the GPC position and the over-
pressurization problem resolved.
S.4 Isolating a System Leak
Let's assume that there is a leak in the RCS. Usually, the leak will
cause a pressure drop in the system that will trigger a caution-
warning alarm. The KA that responds to thk alarm will first try
to differentiate between a failed regulator and a leak in the system.
If it determines that the system has a leak, it will then establish
the goal to isolate that leak. This, in turn, triggers another KA
that first attempts to secure the system This involves requesting
that the astronauts close all valves in the leaking system,
Again, the PRS system IITEItFACR will, throughout each pro-
cees of closing a valve, check that the valve has indeed closed and
that the corresponding talkbacke are registering closed.
As soon as the system has been secured, PRS identifies the
leaking section by checking for decreasing pressure in each section
of the RCS in turn.
6 Conclusion
The experiments described above provided a severe and positive
test of the system's ability to operate proficiently in real time,
to weigh alternative courses of action, to coordinate its activities,
and to modify its intentions in response to a continuously chang-
ing environment. In addition, PRS met every criterion outlined
by Laffey et el. [1988] for evaluating real-time reasoning systems:
high performance, guaranteed response, temporal reasoning capa-
bilities, support for asynchronous inputs, interrupt handling, con-
tinuous operation, handling of noisy (possibly inaccurate) data,
and shiftof focusof attention.
We believethat the followingfeaturesof PRS played an impor-
tant rolein achieving these results.
Procedural reasonlng: The representation of procedural
knowledge using KAs isa very powerful way to describe the ac-
tionsand procedures that should be executed to accomplish spe-
cificgoals or to respond to certaincriticalevents. One essential
feature of the representationis that the elements of these pro-
cedures are described in terms of their bshariors rather than in
terms of arbitrarily named actions or subroutines. For example,
to achieve the goal "close all affected manifolds," it is essential to
be able to reason about the intended set of manifolds and how
the goal is then to be achieved; a call to a specialized procedure
for every variant of this goal is simply too complex and too prone
to error. Furthermore, a descriptive (declarative) representation
of goals provides robustness as different procedures (KAs) can be
used to accomplish the goal depending on the mode of operation,
the availability of resources, or the time required to perform the
task. Moreover, because the purpose of each step in the procedure
is so represented, other processes can independently decide how
to achieve their own goals without thwarting that plan; indeed,
they may even decide to assist.
Reactive and goal-dlrected reasoning: The capability of
being simultaneously data- and goal-driven is a critical feature of
PRS. PRS provides goal-driven reasoning when explicit goals must
be achieved, such as closing a valve, or repressurizing a system. At
the same time, the reactive capabilities of PRS allow it to respond
to critical events that occur, even when PRS is itself attending
to some other task. This capability of reacting to new events
makes the system highly adaptive to situation changes: any plan
can be interrupted and reconsidered in the light of new incoming
information.
Real-tlme reasoning: One of the most important measures in
real-time applications is reaction time; if events are not handled in
a timely fashion, the process can go out of control. PRS has been
designed so that such a guarantee can be furnished. Although PRS
can execute complex conditional plans, the inference mechanism
used in PRS guarantees that any new event is noticed in a bounded
time [Georgeff and lngrand, 1989; Georgeff and Ingrand, 19881.
While the system is executing any procedure, it monitors new
incoming events and goals. Given that the real time behavior of
the metalevel KAs used in a PRS application can be analyzed, the
user can prove that his applicationcan operate in realtime: any
new event istaken care of in a bounded time.
Reasoning about multiple tasks: The intentionstructure
used in PRS enables the system to attend to more than one task
at a time. These multiple intentionsare usually tightlycoupled
and the order in which they are executed can be very important.
Some may require immediate execution on the basisof urgency;
others may have to be scheduled laterthan others because they
depend on the resultsproduced by the earliertasks. Potential
interactionsamong concurrently executing intentionscan also be
criticalin deciding the most appropriate ordering of tasks. PRS
provides the mechanisms toexamine and manipulate the intention
structure directly;the user can thus specifyany kind of priority
or scheduling scheme desired.
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Figure 10: KA for Overpressurized Propellant Tank
Metalevel reasoning: The provision of metalevel KAs allows
the system to control its problem solving strategies in arbitrarily
sophisticated ways. These metalevel KAs follow the same syntax
and semantics _ application KAs, except that they deal with
the control of the execution of PRS itself. Thus one can write
metalevel KAs that can reason efficiently and effectively about
the problem solving process being used. For example, one can
have a KA to control in which order the applicable KAs are going
to be executed. In the example presented in the subsection 5.2, the
metalevel KA makes sure that the system carries on the testing
t_k before the pressure update task, thus allowing the false alarm
to be correctly recognized. Similarly, one can use metalevel KAs to
choose among different ways to perform a given task, or how best
to meet the real-time constraints of the domain given information
on the expected time required for task execution.
Distributed reasoning: PRS is designed for distributed op-
erations. Thus, different instances of PRS can be used in any
application that requires the cooperation of more than one agent.
The different PRS agents run asynchronousIy; their activity is
therefore unconstrained a priori by that of their colleagues. A
message passing mechanism is provided to make possible commu-
nication between the different PRS agents as well as with external
modules such as simulators or monitors.
h number of critical research problems remain to be solved
before the system will be reliable enough for use in actual space
operations. The system is currently being extended to cover all
malfunction handling procedures and flight rules concerning the
RCS and is to be tested against the main shuttle simulators at
3ohnson Space Center in future work.
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